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erful piece of philosophy. Rowe lays bare the crucial elements of all the views 
he attends to, especially Locke's conception of freedom and the libertarian 
alternative developed by Thomas Reid. And Rowe pinpoints their strengths 
and weaknesses with uncanny brilliance. Finally, he explores the libertarian 
conception of freedom with a degree of care, precision, and insight which is 
both admirable and quite rare in the philosophical literature. Rowe has given 
us a wonderful book. 
NOTE 
1. In my paper, "Responsibility and Control," Journal o/Philosophy, 89 (January 1982), 
pp. 24-40, I pursue a strategy that is similar to the Reid/Rowe strategy to the extent that 
they both acknowledge certain implications of the Frankfurt-type examples but insist that 
these examples do not in themselves entail the compatibility of causal determinism and 
moral responsibility. But there is the following difference: whereas the Rowe/Reid strategy 
is a flicker-of-freedom approach and is thus an "alternative-sequence" model of moral 
responsibility, my approach in "Responsibility and Control" is an "actual-sequence" 
model of moral responsibility. 
The Philosophy In Christianity, edited by Godfrey Vesey. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1989. pp. xvi and 244. $16.95 (paper). 
M. JAMIE FERREIRA, University of Virginia. 
This collection of essays represents an unusually broad-ranging sampler of 
studies, both because it covers philosophical theology, historical theology, 
and philosophy of religion and because the essays are by scholars of classical, 
patristic, medieval, and contemporary thought. Moreover, it has, in a sense, 
two themes; these are not co-extensive, but overlap and weave together in 
interesting ways. The general aim stated by Vesey in the introduction-
namely, to explore the "debt" of "early" Christian thinkers "to contemporary 
Platonist philosophy" (p. v)-is adhered to by most, but not all, of the con-
tributors. At one end of the spectrum are essays paradigmatic of that theme, 
like John Dillon's "Logos and Trinity: Patterns of Platonist Influence on Early 
Christianity" and A. H. Armstrong's "On Not Knowing Too Much About 
God," subtitled "The Apophatic Way of the Neoplatonists and other influ-
ences from ancient philosophy which have worked against dogmatic assertion 
in Christian thinking." At the other end are essays, extremely valuable in their 
own right, but totally innocent of any (explicit, at least) concern with Platon-
ist influence on or relevance to Christianity. Those readers with such a con-
cern will find in those essays (the majority) which do adhere rigidly to Vesey's 
formulation of the guiding theme a very satisfying development of thought 
on the subject; they build on each other in interesting ways, in part because 
of the useful back-and-forth between detail and overview among them. 
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The 'other' theme is expressed in the title-and it is neither in principle, 
nor in practice, co-extensive with the first. This theme-the philosophy in 
Christianity-is so phrased as to suggest an intriguing twist on the old stand-
by, philosophical theology, but the promise of that phrasing is not fully played 
out. The notion of a 'divided mind,' which figures prominently in one of the 
essays, itself characterizes this formulation of the theme. Under the rubric of 
'philosophy in Christianity,' two sorts of enterprise seem to inform the col-
lection in a way which sometimes is experienced as a frustrating vacillation 
preventing the intriguing potential from being explored more fully. On the 
other hand, in retrospect, and this is no doubt the intent of the editor, it can 
be read as a rich plumbing of the possibilities within that theme of 'the 
philosophy in Christianity.' One enterprise being carried on is an attempt to 
examine the ways in which philosophy is in Christianity through a meta-level 
exploration of the relations between faith and reason, or theology and phi-
losophy. The methodology in these essays varies, with sometimes a more 
historical emphasis, and sometimes a more philosophical one. The other 
enterprise being carried on is the attempt to do some of the first-order philo-
sophical theology that is highlighted as a category in the meta-level discus-
sion. Among these sorts of essays are those which focus on issues of God's 
foreknowledge and human free will, God's perfection and vulnerability, and 
the intelligibility of talk about two natures in Christ: e.g., "Predestination and 
Freedom in Augustine's Ethics" (Gerard O'Daly), "Foreknowledge and the 
Vulnerability of God" (J. R. Lucas), "Augustine's Philosophy of Being" 
(Christopher Stead), and "Could God Become Man" (Richard Swinburne). 
Indeed, Keith Ward's "God as Creator" is a paradigmatic essay in philosophi-
cal theology which deals with puzzles raised by the doctrine of creation 
(using, among other things, a ten-step modal logic argument, involving "the 
Divine sense of logical possibility" [po 116]). 
This second enterprise may well in itself make the book worthwhile reading 
for many, but I find these examples of relatively straight-forward exercises 
in philosophical theology to be, for the most part, excellent, but very tradi-
tional, discussions which could be found in many a standard anthology. What 
I find more distinctive is the execution of the first enterprise-that is, the 
variety of second-order perspectives on the 'philosophy in Christianity.' We 
find explorations of the ways philosophy is incorporated into or underlies 
developing theological elaborations, as well as of the ways philosophy is 
contained in Christian theology (i.e., constrained by it), as well as of the 
dialectical way in which particular concepts (like piety and salvation) are 
philosophically informed and then exercise constraints on further philosophi-
cal influence. Some of these essays, as I indicated earlier, have a strong 
emphasis on Platonist relevance or influence. Others are more explicit treat-
ments of the relation between faith and reason, but what distinguishes them 
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is that they consider that relation in developing Christianity, focusing on 
patristic and medieval sources. Some, finally, make no attempt to retrieve 
historical resources in their consideration of the relation between philosophy 
and theology (or religion). 
Stuart Brown's "Christian Averroism, Fideism, and the 'Two-fold Truth'" 
is a good example of the striking combination of historical detail and con-
ceptual analysis found in many of these essays. He shows the complexity in 
the Averroist position on theology and philosophy as discrete forms of knowl-
edge as well as the limits of the anti-Averroist response and its relation to 
current debates on the status of religious belief. Indeed, the focus on the 
notion of 'two-fold truth' (along with notions of the singleness of truth, and 
the modes, sources, and levels of truth) actually underlies many of these 
essays, though less explicitly than in Brown's case. Eleonore Stump's "Faith 
and Goodness" offers an intriguing variation on the theme by considering the 
relation between faith and reason through the prism of the concept of 'will' 
(about which O'Daly [pp. 9lff] also says some interesting things) in Aquinas. 
She directs our attention away from 'purely' intellectual evidential consid-
erations in the discussion of belief, to questions of moral goals and import. 
(Stewart Sutherland's essay on "Hope" makes a similar contrast between hope 
as involving "moral vision" and redirection as opposed to considerations of 
empirical outcomes, whether judged in terms of probability or possibility). 
While I have some reservations about the various ways in which she phrases 
the distinction between metaphysical and epistemological claims offered in 
answer to the objection that there is "some sort of argument" for the 
propositions of faith (pp. 183-85), I should say that it is precisely the most 
challenging and rich essays which are worth raising the most questions 
about. 
Other essays, equally welcome, are less expected within such a collection. 
Grace Jantzen's '''Where Two are to Become One'; Mysticism and Monism" 
is such an essay-an exploration of the philosophical commitments of some 
classical mysticism, challenging standard monistic interpretations, is a re-
freshing way to consider the philosophy in Christianity. The essay, moreover, 
is so sensible and enlightening one wonders, with her, why it had not been 
written before. Maurice Wiles' contribution, "The Philosophy in Christianity: 
Arius and Athanasius," is non-traditional in considering both how the phi-
losophy in Christianity is in its heresies, as well as how the way it is in its 
heresies differs from the ways it is in its orthodoxy. The startling suggestion 
that there was no difference of "philosophical approach" between Arius and 
Athanasius is made plausible by examining the difference in "emphasis" 
contained in varying conceptions of piety and salvation and will (which are 
themselves "not wholly independent of philosophical considerations") (pp. 
50-51). Wiles's essay is illustrative of the first, meta-level, enterprise, high-
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lighting the different (and dialectical) ways in which philosophy can figure 
in the development of theology. 
Although Norman Kretzmann, in "Reason In Mystery," makes the claim 
that philosophical theology is the "only theology of more than historical 
interest" (p. 15), his essay is nonetheless not an exercise in first-order philo-
sophical theology, but rather a second-order discussion of the implications of 
the contrast between natural theology and philosophical theology, and the 
canons of credibility at work in the latter. His entire discussion focuses on 
questions of 'rational justification' in the narrow sense which Stump's essay 
attempts to enlarge, but his warning is pertinent and salutary-it would be 
tragic to allow the influential critique of foundationalism found in what has 
come to be known as 'Reformed epistemology' to so focus on the 'natural 
theology' tradition in medieval theology as to obscure the very valuable 
resources for philosophical theology also to be found there. Kretzmann at-
tempts to clarify the task of philosophical theology (which task is itself 
"clarification based on posited doctrinal propositions" [po 27])-more pre-
cisely, he takes on the daring job of addressing philosophy's objections to an 
enterprise whose starting-points are mysteries. Kretzmann's essay relates to 
the others in some interesting ways. Although he has the aim of "furthering 
philosophical theology" (p. 19), his analysis of Aquinas'S position on the 
mystery of the Trinity, illustrating "the way in which medieval philosophical 
theology operates on mystery without running afoul of the Church's position 
or philosophy's objection" (p. 26), is clearly very different from attempts to 
construct plausible theological positions on, say, the Trinity or God's fore-
knowledge. Philosophy in Christianity is read here as "reason in mystery" 
(rather than "reason against mystery") (p. 26); nevertheless, the heart of the 
essay is the second-order consideration of "some of the most formidable 
objections against philosophical theology as carried out in the Middle Ages, 
and some of the ways in which those objections were dealt with" (p. 19). 
Moreover, his stark dichotomy between the "inert [but secure] philosophical 
skeleton" of Greek metaphysics in Christianity and what is "incomparably 
the most interesting and important philosophy in Christianity," namely, the 
active enterprise of philosophical theology (p. 15), tends to obscure the fact 
(brought out so well in several other essays in this volume) that often the 
Greek skeleton is the subject of philosophical theology, what is being theolo-
gized about-as when one is doing philosophical theology about the nature 
of God, the relation between Father and Son, or the relations among the 
Trinity. 
The collection closes with another (less explicit) variation on the theme of 
reason and faith, or philosophy in Christianity-in "Does Philosophy 'Leave 
Everything as it is'? Even Theology?" (which could as easily have served as 
an introduction to the collection), Renford Bambrough offers, in Wittgenste-
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inian fashion, a useful set of reminders, reflections, musings, and questions 
about what it is to 'leave everything as it is.' Exploring the senses in which 
photography, for example, leaves everything as it is, and provocatively asking 
whether theology leaves everything as it is, Bambrough makes us think again 
about the philosophical status of 'description' and the ways in which philo-
sophical accounts can contour religious responses. 
Anthologies are particularly frustrating objects for review, for one can 
never even begin to do justice to the individual essays. Acknowledging that, 
let me commend this collection for its richness: it addresses a perennial 
question with remarkable detail across a wide historical range, and the pages 
are full of intriguing suggestions; it is frustrating only in its great diversity, 
not in its quality. 
Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations, by David Ray Griffin. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991. Pp. xiv and 277. 
DAVID BASINGER, Roberts Wesleyan College. 
In 1976, David Griffin published God, Freedom, and Evil, a book in which 
he argued that the solution to the problem of evil proposed by process theism 
is superior to those solutions available within traditional (classical) theism. 
Evil Revisited consists largely of responses to critiques of his earlier book. 
But it is not simply a collection of independent counter-responses to specific 
criticisms. It is a coherent, self-contained restatement of Griffin's belief that 
only process theists can offer an adequate theistic response to the scope and 
intensity of the evil we encounter. 
Griffin begins by outlining the three theodicies with which the book is 
concerned. Proponents of traditional all-determining theism, we are told, 
believe that "God in fact totally determines every event, including all human 
decisions and actions, and therefore all 'sinful' acts" (p. 13). And thus, to 
preserve God's goodness, they must ultimately deny that there is any genuine 
evil-any evil that is not necessary for bringing about some greater good or 
avoiding some greater evil-and acknowledge instead that each instance of 
evil is a necessary component in God's perfect creative plan. 
Proponents of traditional free-will theism, Griffin continues, agree with 
proponents of traditional all-determining theism that "God essentially has all 
the power in the universe" (p. 14). They agree, for instance, that God could 
unilaterally have created a world with no genuine evil. But free-will theists 
also hold that "God has voluntarily delegated power to creatures" (p. 14). 
Specifically, they hold that God has given us significant freedom-the free-
dom to bring about good or evil-because he desires that we develop "moral 
and spiritual qualities through free decisions" and "because pain and suffering 
